Theoretical developments in the analysis of organizations have recently turned to an "organizational becoming" perspective, which sees the social world as enacted in the micro-context of communicative interactions among individuals through which meaning is negotiated. According to this view, organizational change is endemic, natural and ongoing; it occurs in every-day interactions as actors engage in the process of establishing new meanings for organizational activities. We adopt this approach to study how meanings were negotiated by senior and middle managers in a workshop held as part of a culture change program at a telecommunications company. Our study identifies two very different patterns in these negotiations, constituted by the particular communicative practices adopted by participants. We discuss the implications of these patterns for organizational change in relation to generative dialogue and power-resistance relations between senior and middle managers.
Theoretical developments in the analysis of organizations have recently turned to a perspective referred to as "organizational becoming" (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Carlsen, 2006) , which draws attention to two important aspects of organizations. First, organizations are viewed not as fixed entities, but as unfolding enactments. "Organization" is an emergent property of change -a temporary pattern constituted by and shaped from micro-interactions among actors, situated in their everyday work -while change is endemic, natural and ongoing. Second, organization is contingent upon language. Organizational structures and processes are held in place through language, while changes in patterns of organizing depend upon new language, the meaning of which is negotiated among actors in their communicative interactions. Organizational change thus results from ongoing linguistic exchanges among actors (Ford and Ford, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005) as they negotiate meaning (Hardy, Lawrence and Grant, 2005; Tsoukas, 2005) .
This perspective has important implications for the way in which organizational change is conceptualized and managed. First, while senior managers may intervene in the negotiations over meaning with particular outcomes in mind (Carlsen, 2006) , it is not helpful to think of change programs simply as the realization of a particular management plan. Instead, a change plan is a "discursive template" -a text produced by a particular author, which has to be interpreted by those whom it addresses in the context of specific local circumstances (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002: 579) .
Senior managers may hold privileged positions in terms of their ability to introduce new templates but, ultimately, the meanings of these texts have to be negotiated with other organizational members, as a result of which they may be changed (cf. Maguire and Hardy, 2009 ). Organizational change is thus a "multi-authored" process (Buchanan and Dawson 2007: 669) as actors co-construct shared meanings (Collins, 1981) . Second, the creation of shared meanings does not, however, necessarily lead to the innovative, synergistic solutions typically associated with successful organizational change initiatives, (Hardy, Lawrence and Grant, 2005) since shared meanings can also be associated with imposed change and compliance (Hardy and Phillips, 1998) . Therefore, the idea of multi-authored change has been further elaborated with the concept of "generative" (Gergen, Gergen and Barrett, 2004) , "productive" (Tsoukas, forthcoming) , and "creative" (Gratton and Ghoshal, 2002) dialogue, which is needed to bring about the fresh distinctions, new connections and novel experiences associated with successful organizational change (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) through the active engagement of a wide range of actors in the negotiation of meaning (cf. Westley, 1990) . Third, organizational becoming calls into question traditional conceptions of resistance to change since engagement with new meanings proposed by senior managers or change agents involves challenge and modification by other employees. In the change literature, such challenges are typically framed as a problem -a dysfunctional response by subordinates to obstruct the efforts of senior managers to bring about change (Dent and Goldberg, 1999) . In the context of multi-authored change, rather than representing a hindrance, resistance is integral to successful change (Ford et al., 2008) , and changes to senior managers' or change agents' discursive templates are to be expected, even encouraged.
We explore these issues by drawing on the perspective of organizational becoming to provide a detailed, real-time analysis of the negotiation of meaning by members of a telecommunications company during a workshop conducted as part of a culture change program. The workshop was one of a series of 80 held throughout the company as a means of involving employees in the change program.
The workshops all worked from the same text -a "culture toolkit" which consisted of a brochure, a video and a set of instructions -and followed the same process. Our analysis of the workshop shows the emergence of two very different patterns in the negotiation of meaning. One pattern conformed to notions of "generative" dialogue, the other to "degenerative" dialogue (Gergen, 2003) . Both forms of dialogue co-existed in the same workshop and can be traced to the use of different communicative practices, at particular times, by senior and middle managers. We discuss the role that powerresistance relations played in these negotiations and the implications for organizational change.
The study makes three contributions. First, we show how organizational becoming can inform an empirical study of how meaning is negotiated in organizational talk targeted towards organizational change objectives. Second, by studying patterns in the negotiation of meaning and examining powerresistance relations, we develop a model that shows how particular communicative practices can lead to generative dialogue, in which resistance plays a facilitative role, resulting in organizational change based on the transformation of knowledge. Third, we also show how particular communicative practices can produce degenerative dialogue and oppositional power-resistance relations, thereby extending existing models to identify the specific dynamics through which these practices lead to the imposition of meaning in change initiatives and serve to inhibit the production of new knowledge.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first provide an overview of the work on organizational becoming. Second, we introduce our case study and explain our methods of data collection and analysis. Third, we present our findings and discuss their implications.
Organizational Becoming
Underlying an organizational becoming perspective (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Carlsen, 2006) are two ontological assumptions. First, organizations are not fixed entities, but enactments: "unfolding processes involving actors making choices interactively, in inescapably local conditions" (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002: 577) . "Organization" is an emergent property of this ongoing change -a temporary pattern constituted by and shaped from micro-interactions as actors perform their everyday work. Such "performative" accounts of change focus "on situated human agency unfolding in time" and offer insights into the emergence and accomplishment of change (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002:572) . Change thus becomes the normal and inevitable condition of organization life rather than being seen as exceptional and episodic (Bechky, 2006) . Organization is a temporary outcome of organizing (cf. Weick, 1995) and instead of privileging stability, researchers treat disequilibrium as natural and ongoing (Chiles, Meyer and Hench: 2004) .
Second, an organizational becoming perspective emphasizes the constructive effects of language (Tsoukas, 2005, forthcoming) as situations are "talked into existence and the basis is laid for action to deal with it" (Taylor and Van Every 2000: 58; quoted in Weick and Sutcliff, 2005: 413) .
Speech acts (Searle, 1969) , discourse (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004) , narratives (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007) , dialogue (Gergen et al., 2004) and conversations (Ford and Ford, 1995) thus reproduce -or transform -organizational practices. This perspective views organizations as enacted in the micro-context of communicative interactions among individuals (Boden, 1994; Weick and Sutcliff, 2005) and focuses on "ongoing authoring acts situated in everyday work" (Carlsen, 2006: 132) .
Language is a generative mechanism through which the collective actions (Hardy et al., 2005) and discursive coordination (Gergen et al., 2004 ) that enact organizations are achieved (Robichaud, Giroux and Taylor, 2004; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) , while "organizational change is the process of constructing and sharing new meanings and interpretations of organizational activities" (Tsoukas, 2005: 98) .
Language has no inherent meaning however. Language provides the "potential for meaning" (Gergen et al., 2004: 45) , which is realized only as individuals communicate with each other. Meaning is negotiated among actors over time through dialogue -unfolding social interaction between two or more people that is contextually embedded, as well as historically and culturally situated (Gergen et al., 2004) . It has been argued that meaning which is co-constructed by a range of actors through dialogue that is "productive" (Tsoukas, forthcoming) or "generative" (Gergen et al., 2004 ) is more likely to bring about innovative and synergistic organizational change. Such dialogue is unobstructed and extended (Gergen, 2003) : it builds mutuality through awareness of others and unfolding interaction (Putnam and Fairhurst, 2001 ); it involves affirmation, which serves to acknowledge previous utterances as meaningful (Gergen et al., 2004) ; and it distributes reasoning so that participants are willing to alter their views (Tsoukas, forthcoming) . As a result, a new common sensibility emerges regarding the matter under discussion (Collins, 1981; Hardy et al., 2005) . In contrast, when dialogue is "degenerative" (Gergen, 2003) , discourse is monologic and meaning is imposed through moves that destroy the meaning-making potential of preceding utterances (Gergen et al., 2004) . Accordingly, interactions are calculated. At best they are minimally cooperative, at worst, conflict-ridden (Tsoukas, forthcoming) . Collective action may still result but it is more likely to be in the form of enforced compliance rather than the synergistic and innovative outcomes often hoped for in organizational change initiatives (Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Hardy et al., 2005) .
The question remains: how are the meanings that constitute organizational change -and organizations -negotiated? Given that organizations are permeated by hierarchical relations, occupational differences and vested interests, it is "naïve" to assume that actors share the same goals and interests and to ignore the "red meat" of power and politics (Weick, et al, 2005: 418) . Particular meanings have consequences for the nature of organizing (Gergen et al., 2004) , as a result of which actors struggle "to frame discursive and nondiscursive practices within a system of meanings that is commensurate with that individual's or group's own interests" (Deetz and Mumby, 1990: 32) . Senior managers or change agents may vest their aspirations and expectations in the discursive templates that they use to frame change initiatives (Tsoukas, 2005) but middle managers, who are regularly charged with interpreting, communicating and implementing change (Lüscher and Lewis 2008) , may resist these templates and offer alternative interpretations (cf. Maguire and Hardy, 2009) . Despite their supposed disadvantaged position, those with less hierarchical authority, expert credentials or economic resources, such as middle managers and other employees, can nonetheless exercise power discursively Levina and Orlikowski, forthcoming) .
The negotiation of meaning is therefore inevitably infused with power-resistance relations.
Traditionally, power and resistance have been treated separately, with the exercise of power seen as domination while resistance constitutes actions taken to challenge it (Barbalet, 1985; Clegg and Hardy, 1996) . More recently, Foucault's (1980) work has led to a reconceptualization of this relationship insofar as power and resistance are seen as diffuse, co-constitutive and multidimensional. There "are no relations of power without resistances: the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised" (Foucault, 1980: 142) . Power and resistance operate as part of the complex web of relations linking actors in everyday organizational life (Kondo, 1990 ) and together comprise a system of relations in which the possibilities for both -as well as tensions between them -co-exist (Sawicki, 1991) . Power is never complete and, instead, is always open to the possibilities of resistance as actors struggle to maintain or promote their preferred meanings (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994) . So although senior managers and change agents may be in a privileged position to negotiate meaning (Collinson, 1994) in so far as they design and introduce change initiatives, there is no guarantee that their interests will prevail. Such struggles are not necessarily negative or repressive, however, since there is always a creative potential to powerresistance relations as meanings are reordered and renegotiated -power-resistance relations are thus enabling as well as constraining (Mumby, 2005) .
In sum, the literature indicates that organizational change processes are contingent upon the negotiation of meaning which, in turn, is permeated by power-resistance relations. However, so far we know little about the specific dynamics of these relationships. Our research question therefore is: How does the negotiation of meaning influence organizational change; and what is the role of powerresistance relations in these processes?
Methods
We conducted a detailed, real-time analysis of the negotiation of meaning by members of a At the time of the study, UTel employed approximately 1,500 employees, most of whom were located at the European head office, with the remainder working in sites in UK, mainland Europe, Asia and North America. The company had been formed in 2001, when it was "spun off" from being an internal division of GlobalTel, a global telecommunications company that was undergoing major restructuring and redundancies at the time, as a result of low cost competitors and lower growth in the mobile phone market worldwide. As an independent organization, UTel changed from being part of a much larger company that made mobile phones for the end-user to one that sold "knowledge" to mobile phone manufacturers. Its success now hinged on the replacement of the existing engineering focus, which stemmed from its previous position as a unit that interacted primarily with other divisions within GlobalTel, with a culture that focused on the new customer -no longer the end-user of the phone but other companies who manufactured and sold phones.
Senior management, together with external consultants, had devised a cultural change program involving a series of 80 workshops to be rolled out across the company. Each workshop was organized around a "culture toolkit" that consisted of a brochure, a video and a set of instructions for conducting the workshops. The brochure entitled UTel's Target Culture: Involving Every Employee specified a target culture for the company in broad terms relating to four drivers of business success (unity in team work; technological innovation; excellent customer service; and leadership) and four shared values (trust, empowerment, commitment, and quality). Given the company's mission: "to make our customers first, best and profitable through innovation, quality and commitment", the new culture was expected to be more customer-focused. The brochure also described an implementation process involving additional workshops that were to be run by middle managers, that involved using the culture toolkit to review the target culture in order "to discuss how it affects their team, themselves as individuals, and Utel." The video, shown during the workshop, was a 10-minute question and answer session between the CEO and another senior manager. It explained why a new culture was needed and provided further information on the drivers and the values that underpinned it. It also presented a view of the implementation of the new culture, as the CEO stated that the "next step is to involve everybody" through the additional workshops. The instructions specified the activities for each half-day workshop: (a) a presentation of the target culture, using the brochure and accompanying video; (b) a discussion of the relevance of the target culture to the particular group attending the workshop; and (c) exercises to build agreement on actions to be taken to implement the target culture.
The initial workshops were led by head office and senior site managers, and involved middle managers from different engineering and support staff functions. The middle managers were then required to replicate the workshop with their own subordinates, again using the same culture toolkit to provide a broad framework for agreement on the nature of the new culture and how it was to be implemented. The brochure stated that senior managers could not "take all the responsibility [for the change program] by themselves. Everyone has to contribute to create a strong company culture by participating in our 'new target culture program'"(brochure). More specifically, the aim was to secure involvement and input from employees and to bring about agreement on what the nature of the new culture should be and how it should be implemented from across the company.
Site Selection
The site was selected, firstly, because the workshops involved negotiating the meaning of a change program, which was deliberately described in ambiguous terms. The culture toolkit specified the target culture only in broad and vague terms, emphasizing that managers and employees should "build a [not "the'] strong company culture together" (brochure). The workshops were intended to "complete the picture of our target culture" and "agree on action" on how it was to be implemented (brochure). Second, these negotiations involved employees from different levels, locations, and departments in the development and implementation of the new culture. It was led by senior managers from the company's European headquarters and from the local UK site, while the other participants were a range of middle managers from the UK site. As such, the negotiation of meaning in the workshop clearly involved two distinct managerial groups -senior and middle managers -and we therefore expected to be able to witness the dynamics of the power-resistance relations between them.
Third, the workshop represented a series of structured interactions that could be observed in real time, and which would be repeated in a similar fashion through out the company. Naturally occurring talk in real time -such as meetings and workshops -are excellent sites for finely-grained analyses of how events unfold and how plans are translated into action as they are modified, adapted and changed (cf. Kärreman and Alvesson, 2001 ).
Data Collection
Background information on the change program was gathered through the collection of company documents such as reports, press releases, and preliminary interviews. One of workshops, conducted as part of the change program, was observed by one of the authors, recorded and fully transcribed. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with eighteen of the participants, who were asked for their views on different groups in the company and the change program. The interviews lasted between one and two hours in length, were recorded, and then transcribed verbatim.
The observed workshop lasted three hours and was attended by three head office managers, two senior managers from the UK plant, and 31 middle managers -support staff managers and senior software and hardware engineers. The participants represented a mix of ethnic groups, ranged in age from early thirties to mid forties, and were predominantly men (three women were present). A senior site manager from the UK plant started the session by welcoming participants and introducing the head office managers, one of whom provided an overview of the outline and goals of the workshop.
Another senior manager made a PowerPoint presentation that described his interpretation of the local culture and its strengths and weaknesses, followed by a general discussion about whether this interpretation was accurate. Following a coffee break there was a discussion about the mission statement specified in the brochure, and the video was shown. Then participants completed a "stop/start/continue" exercise to identify one behavior that was hindering cultural change and needed to be stopped, one new behavior that needed to be started, and one existing behavior that should be continued, the results of which were collected by the head office managers. The workshop concluded with a discussion of how to implement the change program.
Data Analysis
The interviews indicated that members of five different managerial groups were involved in the workshop: senior personnel who worked at the head office; another group of senior managers who worked at the local UK site; and three groups of middle managers -software engineers, hardware engineers, and support staff (e.g., HR, finance, sales and marketing). We categorized all workshop participants as belong to one of these groups for the purposes of the first stage of analysis (see below) and later collapsed them into two broader groupings of senior and middle managers in order to carry out the second stage of analysis.
We examined the workshop transcript to explore the negotiation of meaning i.e., the communicative interactions in which meanings were debated, contested and/or agreed by participants.
We selected negotiations around two key meanings represented by the culture toolkit: (a) a customer focus as part of the new culture; and (b) the implementation of the new culture. Our preliminary analysis indicated that these two sets of negotiations differed markedly. Thus, by comparing these two sets of negotiations, we could pursue "transparently observable" processes (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537) .
We extracted all instances of talk about customer focus and implementation from the workshop transcript. We placed all the relevant discussion in chronological order and identified who made each intervention i.e., a specific statement or interjection. We then tracked how the negotiations over meanings unfolded during the workshop by examining: the development of different meanings over time; the order or flow of interventions; whether interventions built on or disagreed with earlier meanings; whether different groups engaged with each others' meanings or engaged in defensive reiterations of previously held meanings; and when and how the negotiations of meaning ended. In this way, we were able to establish patterns in the degree to which meaning was co-constructed by a range of actors or imposed by a small group of actors. By comparing the two sets of negotiations, we identified two distinct patterns in how participants collectively negotiated meaning, as discussed in the findings. The appendices provide an abridged version of the transcripts to illustrate the different patterns in the negotiations.
Finally, we re-examined each individual intervention according to whether it was made by senior managers (from head office or the UK site) or middle managers (software engineers, hardware engineers or support staff). We then noted the patterns in terms of how each intervention engaged with earlier interventions e.g., whether it built on, affirmed, asked questions of, or disagreed with earlier interventions and whether interventions proposed new meanings or repeated earlier meanings. We also noted other patterns such as the use of authority, and different ways of referring to the culture toolkit.
From this inductive analysis, we established 13 different communicative practices (Table 1) . We then compared the use of these practices in the two sets of negotiations and found major differences between those used by senior and middle managers, as discussed in the findings.
- Table 1 near here-
Findings
We first discuss the negotiation of meaning of customer focus and then of implementation.
Negotiations around customer focus
The meaning of customer focus, broadly described in the culture toolkit, was negotiated by the participants as they worked through the exercises, referred to the brochure and reflected on the video during the course of the workshop. Four main strands to these negotiations can be observed, each relating to a different meaning of "customer focus". They are: (a) who is the customer?, a discussion that ended prior to the conclusion of the workshop with some agreement over the customer being an external business; (b) the nature of the relationship with the customer, which proposed a need for honesty, although this meaning was taken up and superseded by other discussions around the need for a commercial focus; (c) are we customer focused?, which concluded in agreement that the UK site was customer focused although, again, this meaning was superseded by the need for a commercial focus; (d) the need for a commercial focus which emerged during the workshop (see Figure 1 ).
- Figure 1 near hereAt the start of the workshop, in the opening address by a senior manager, the need to achieve a "common understanding" of customer focus is introduced: "It's important that we have a strong UTel culture in this organization to be customer focused, we need to actually get a common understanding… and hopefully feed back any concerns and issues that may crop up." A head office manager then puts forward a number of suggestions on how customer focus might be defined and i.e., as being financially aware and helping the company to be profitable.
Commercial … to me means … UTel profitability. And it doesn't matter a hell of a lot about customer profitability, customer on time, customer this, customer that and customer the other, I have never yet heard a UTel manager say "we've got to make a lot of money" [support staff manager].
By the end of the discussion, the group has come to an agreement that a customer focus is less important than the need for a commercial focus.
In sum, our analysis shows that in negotiating the meaning of customer focus, participants regularly built on earlier interventions by both middle and senior managers to develop an understanding of what a customer focus would be, who the customer was, whether or not they were already customer focused and, eventually, the need for a commercial focus. In this instance, different meanings built on each other, helping to transform knowledge concerning the need for a customer focus -and whether there already was one -into the need for a commercial focus. There is evidence of mutual reciprocity, a willingness to be influenced (with both senior and middle managers altering their understandings), distributed reasoning, and the emergence of a common sensibility around a commercial focus.
Communicative Practices
We identified the use of a number of specific communicative practices whereby both senior and middle managers engaged each other in the negotiation of meaning. For example, while it is a senior manager who initially invites a discussion of customer focus and proposes the original meaning at the opening of the workshop by making reference to the culture toolkit and saying: "it's important that we have a strong culture" that is "customer focused", it is a middle manager who challenges the initial meaning that the company is not sufficiently customer focused.
Can we have just a hands-up? Who thinks we are customer focused just. … So about sixty percent … think we are customer focused [software engineer].
This meaning is then reiterated by other middle managers. For example, a second software engineer immediately follows with: "I think we have a perception we're customer focused." Following a restatement of his position by the original software engineer, a hardware engineer further reiterates the point by saying: "I think it's an important point that we are customer focused."
It is also a middle manager who proposes the new meaning of the need for a commercial focus:
But you also need to look at the different streams of being customer focused and commercially focused, I'm not sure that as an organization we're necessarily
This meaning is again reiterated by other middle managers, especially when it is reintroduced in the stop/start/continue exercise. The support staff manager's statement: "I think we've all agreed we need to improve our commercial awareness not our customer focus" is immediately followed by another support staff manager saying: "We need to be more business focused." General agreement is indicated by other middle managers in the form of "Yeahs" and nodding of heads, as well as the following:
What's the interesting thing with all this culture stuff is that there is nothing anywhere about things that matter from our point of view, like profitability and, and our commercial Certainly from an HR point of view, I think we don't have the commercial awareness that we should have. There are some managers who are OK but there are some who have no idea about how the money is earned on a project -and I don't see that as being commercially focused [senior site manager].
Senior managers also seek clarification of middle managers' meanings in ways that open up the negotiation of meaning with statements like "What do you mean?". There is only one incident where a senior manager attempts to dismiss the meaning proposed by a middle manager by saying "I don't agree with that." There is also frequent affirmation of middle managers' contributions with senior managers making statements like "Good point" and "That's a valuable point." And, at the end of the discussion, the need for a commercial focus was affirmed by two senior managers:
We should start being profit focused … continue to improve the commercial focus of the organization because if you're long term from a commitment point of view we need to be committed to being more commercial focused [senior site manager].
OK [head office manager].
In sum, we can see that particular communicative practices i.e., inviting, proposing, building, clarifying, and affirming on the part of senior managers and building, challenging and reiterating on the part of middle managers helped to engage both groups in the negotiations. In this communicative context, a range of senior and middle managers participated in and contributed to different arguments relating to the need for, and definition of, customer focus that eventually culminated in the transformation of the meaning of the target culture -from a customer focus to a commercial focus.
Negotiations around Implementation
The workshop participants also negotiated the meaning of implementation. In contrast with customer focus, these negotiations were much more polarized with two parallel, separate discussions:
one involving senior managers and the other involving middle managers, with little evidence of engagement between them. Despite a head office manager initially encouraging the middle managers to identify the actions required for implementation, subsequent contributions to the debate by senior managers were all attempts to fix the meaning of implementation around their predetermined program.
Senior managers defined implementation in terms of the next step -a continuation of the workshopsto create awareness of the existing culture, while specific implementation activities were to be decided by head office. Contrasting with this, engineers and support staff tried to fix the meaning of implementation in terms of local actions, which required, clear direction, road maps, and time lines.
- Figure 2 near here- Figure 2 shows the flows of negotiation around the meanings of implementation. At the start of the workshop, a head office manager sets out one of the workshop's aim as being to arrive at a collective identification of the actions to be taken to implement the change program at the local site
. 5 Fifty minutes later, a software engineer picks up the issue of implementation, suggesting that it requires a clear direction, something which is currently lacking: "we need to know where we're going 5 The numbers in square brackets provide a cross reference to Figure 2 In sum, our analysis shows that different groups tried to impose their preferred meaning of implementation. Instead of participants building on earlier interventions, there was a far higher incidence of interventions that refuted or challenged opposing meanings. As a result, meanings became polarized -senior managers returned time and time again to the process of implementation (the continuation of the workshops), while middle managers continued to emphasize the need for actions and measurable outcomes. Thus two parallel discussions emerged around the defense of preferred meanings, with little evidence of relational engagement.
Communicative Practices
The Rather than being the subject of negotiation, repeated attempts are made to reify the culture toolkit by senior management by presenting it as having a non-negotiable and fixed meaning regarding implementation. Instead of using it to facilitate the negotiation of different meanings, senior managers use it to promote and legitimate their preferred meaning. Senior managers refer to the culture toolkit (in the case of the video), point at it (in the case of the PowerPoint slides on the timeline) and wave it about (in the case of the brochure), as they invoke it to justify adhering to their specified implementation plan, rather than modifying it in light of the points raised by middle managers. Middle managers employ some of the same communicative practices that they used in the case of customer focus. For example, they initially challenge the senior managers' meaning and propose an alternative one, which they continue to reiterate. However, they do not engage in any building and, in response to continued attempts by senior managers to reproduce their own preferred meaning of implementation, middle managers also resort to a different approach with their communicative practices. They try to undermine management by making statements critical of senior managers to discredit their meanings, and hold them to account i.e., middle managers demand actions from senior managers that would contradict their proposed meaning of implementation and/or question a lack of action on the part of senior managers in ways that discredited their meaning.
In sum, senior managers used dismissing, reiterating, deploying authority, invoking hierarchy, and reification, especially towards the end of the workshop when they escalated and intensified the use of these practices, "bundling" multiple communicative practices into their interventions. Middle managers attempted to resist senior management's meaning through challenging, reiterating, and holding to account and undermining. Rather than build on these alternative meanings of implementation proposed by middle managers during the workshop, senior managers explicitly invoked a reified version of the culture toolkit to signal a single, non-negotiable meaning:
You should have … the video … I will email you the slides that we presented today As senior managers relied on the increasing use of interventions that served to reinforce their preferred meaning of implementation towards the end of the workshop, middle managers appeared to give up trying to negotiate its meaning and, around the 2 hour mark, the number of middle managers' interventions started to decline. Thus, the communicative practices adopted by senior and middle managers in relation to implementation reinforced the polarized meanings of the two groups.
Discussion
In this section, we develop a model showing how the intersection of particular communicative practices by the two groups of managers led to different dynamics in the negotiation of meaning which have implications for organizational change. We also explore how our study contributes to other work on generative forms of dialogue, through such means as "great talk" (Gratton and Ghoshal, 2002) , "honest conversations" (Beer and Eisenstat, 2004) , and "decisive dialogue" (Charan, 2006) , as well as providing new insights into how resistance contributes to organizational change.
Dynamics in the Negotiation of Meaning
The two sets of dynamics in the negotiation of meaning are represented in Figure 3 . The first dynamic results from the intersection of two sets of communicative practices: inviting, proposing, building, clarifying and affirming by senior managers, and building, challenging and reiterating by middle managers. The intersection of these practices produces what we refer to as a relational engagement, by which we mean that both parties take active responsibility for the joint tasks in which they are involved and suspend "irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if they were favorably resolved" (Möllering, 2006:110-1) . This, in turn, helps to produce generative dialogue, characterized by what Tsoukas (forthcoming) refers to as the collaborative emergence of new meanings, insofar as a range of middle and senior managers contribute to identifying the need for a commercial focus, which was not part of the original discursive template but which emerged during the workshop. The dialogue is also characterized by constrained novelty as participants make small modifications at each dialogue turn. Interventions follow from the initial meaning of customer focus but, at the same time, help to construct another meaning (i.e., the need for a commercial focus), which is both novel -it is different to the original meaning -and familiar in that it emerges incrementally as a result of a series of ever-changing modifications that build on each other.
- Figure 3 near herePower-resistance relations are facilitative insofar as middle managers engage in communicative practices that might be construed as "resistance to change" in that they challenge senior managers' meanings. It is this resistance that leads to the emergence of the need for commercial focus i.e., it is the willingness of middle and senior managers to engage with each other, which gives rise to conceptual expansion, combination and reframing (see Tsoukas, forthcoming) . Specifically, the meaning of the customer is semantically expanded to include the end user, other businesses, and internal members of the organization over the course of the workshop. Concepts are combined as the new business-to-business customer is linked to the new post-spin off, business-to-business organization and reframing arises as the focus on the customer focus changes to a commercial focus. When the different groups struggle to impose their preferred meanings, we characterize power-resistance relations as oppositional (cf. Ashforth and Mael, 1998) . Here, there is little evidence of the meanings related to implementation being opened up in the negotiations. Instead we see a process that might be described as conceptual closure as different meanings are fixed by both sides.
This can be clearly seen in instances of reification, where senior managers reel off the implementation procedures as set out in their discursive template (the culture tool kit) to reinforce their preferred meaning. In addition, rather than being combined, concepts are demarcated. With neither side willing to engage in the communicative practice of building, there is no way to bring the two meanings together or to use one to inform the other. Finally, conceptual sterility arises with the dialogue losing momentum as senior managers engage increasingly in coercive communicative practices (i.e., greater use of dismissing, reiterating, deploying authority, invoking hierarchy and reifying and bundling them together in a single intervention); and the number of interventions by middle managers gradually declines. The result is a standoff as both sides steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the others' meaning and, despite attempts by middle managers to give an alternative definition of implementation, their statements are ignored and existing knowledge (e.g., understandings articulated in the initial discursive template) is reproduced.
Managing Change
This study makes important contributions to the existing work on generative forms of dialogue and productive conversations (see Mengis and Eppler, 2008 for a summary of this literature). First, it provides a way to ground some of the more general prescriptions that feature in this literature in more specific forms of interaction. For example, exhortations for senior managers to "balance" power structures (Mengis and Eppler, 2008: 1303) ; to "protect" subordinates (Beer and Eisenstat, 2004: 86) and give them "permission" to engage in conversation (Gratton and Ghoshal, 2002: 222) fail to address the nuances whereby such forms of participation have to be enacted through communicative practices over time. Similarly, recommendations to link new statements to previous contributions (Mengis and Eppler, 2008) or to institutionalize questioning and doubt (Gratton and Ghoshal, 2002) do not take into account the idea that "linking" can take a number of different forms from building to dismissing, while "questioning" can range from challenging to undermining. Our study provides insights into the types of specific communicative practices -such as building, challenging, affirming, etc. -that can enact and sustain these more general prescriptions.
Second, the work on conversations and dialogue tends to assume that meaning is fixed and predetermined, whereas we highlight how the same communicative practice may lead to quite different outcomes depending on the temporal and relational dynamics of the micro-context in which it is used. For example, to say that the conversation should be about issues that matter (Beer and Eisenstat, 2004) or based on meaningful issues (Gratton and Ghoshal, 2002) misses the point that an issue may cease to be meaningful if actors are not willing to participate in negotiations. In our study, both senior and middle managers felt that implementation was meaningful at the beginning of the workshop. The former initiated a discussion on its meaning, while the latter engaged in this discussion by offering alternative meanings. By the end of the workshop, however, implementation had ceased to be meaningful to middle managers who gave up trying to define it. In other words, it is not the case that an issue is or is not meaningful. Rather, issues are made meaningful (or not) through communicative practices. Similarly, middle managers' use of reiterating in response to senior managers' attempts to build on their definitions of customer focus involved a collaborative engagement by both parties. In contrast, their use of reiteration in response to senior managers' attempts to dismiss alternative meanings of implementation represented a defensive maneuver. In other words, the impact of a particular communicative practice depends upon who is employing it, when, and in response to what.
Finally, in showing that the same conversation (in this case, the workshop) produced both a breakthrough and a standoff, depending on the way in which particular communicative practices are juxtaposed over time, we redress the tendency of the literature to categorize a particular conversation as either effective or ineffective (e.g., Gratton and Ghoshal, 2002; Beer and Eisenstat, 2004) . Our study shows that the same conversation can be both. The existing literature has little to say about the impact of communicative practices as they interact over time within a particular conversation. Instead, this literature tends to focus on more generic recommendations that operate at the level of a particular conversation i.e., how to create a good, great, or honest conversation. This, however, serves to reify the conversation, rather than showing the ways in which the conversation is brought into being on an ongoing basis through the interaction of communicative practices.
Resistance and Change
This study also provides a number of insights into the work on resistance in organizational change. First, it shows how resistance can play a facilitative role in organizational change. The conventional wisdom in the change literature is that resistance is an inevitable and natural reaction, triggered because individuals are fearful, have resistant personalities, or misunderstand the benefits of the proposed change (Dent and Goldberg, 1999; Bennebroek Gravenhorst and In't Veld, 2004; Symon, 2005) . In other words, resistance is typically framed as a negative "Newtonian" response of workers "kicking back against management control" and hindering change initiatives (Thomas and Davies, 2005: 685) . Such occurrences justify activities by senior managers or change agents to quell "insubordination" (Hardy and Clegg, 2004) and "correct" recalcitrant individuals (Symon, 2005) . In contrast, our study shows that, rather than a hindrance to change, facilitative resistance contributed to it through conceptual expansion, combination, and reframing. As Ford et al., (2008) have pointed out:
thoughtful resistance can play a much more important role in sustaining organizational change than unquestioning acceptance.
Second, the study shows how facilitative resistance is produced from the intersection of specific communicative practices of senior and of subordinate managers. In this way, we provide empirical evidence to support claims that the greater involvement of middle managers in taking on an active role in leadership and change is advantageous (e.g., Lüscher and Lewis 2008; Pearce and Conger, 2003) . We also show the types of communicative practices that differentiate facilitative from oppositional resistance. In Ford et al.'s (2008: 372) terms, the communicative practices that constitute facilitative resistance involve a series of "counter-offers" i.e., "a move in a conversation made by someone who is willing and receptive to the request yet is seeking some accommodation" (Ford et al., 2008: 373) . In other words, subordinates are willing to demand an accommodation (through such communicative practices as building, challenging and reiterating) and senior managers or change agents are willing to make an accommodation by engaging with these meanings even though they are different to the ones they originally proposed. Thus facilitative resistance requires counter-offers to be made by both groups of managers or, in Ford et al.'s (2008) terms, change agents and change recipients.
Third, the study indicates what is likely to happen when senior managers are unwilling to make such accommodations i.e., degenerative dialogue and oppositional power-resistance relations result in imposed change based on existing, rather than new, knowledge. We therefore offer empirical support for the idea that senior managers or change agents "who are resistant to the ideas, proposals, and counteroffers submitted by change recipients" (Ford et al., 2008: 367) may be as much to blame for failed change initiatives as so-called resistance by subordinates. Change may still ensue but, by holding to existing assumptions and refusing to engage with alternative meanings, senior managers reduce the chances that it will be innovative or synergistic. The resulting vicious circle of imposition and opposition enacts a degenerative dialogue and oppositional power-resistance relations where managers employ more coercive communicative practices (e.g., dismissing, deploying authority, invoking hierarchy and reifying) more intensively (in our case, they bundled these practices so that a single intervention accomplishes multiple practices). In turn, middle managers become less likely to engage with senior managers' meanings and are more likely to defend their own. In this way, senior managers, by resisting (perceived) resistance from subordinates, help to bring that resistance into being (cf. Prasad and Prasad, 2000) .
Finally, our study shows that communicative practices do not only underpin change, they are also constitutive of the hierarchical relations that permeate organizations. For example, in the case of implementation, senior managers engaged in communicative practices that reproduced hierarchical distinctions between the two groups. These practices -dismissing, deploying authority, invoking hierarchy and reifying the culture tool kit -represent important means through which power is exercised. For example, dismissing is a declarative speech act (Cooren, 2004 ) -an authorized pronouncement that instructs (Searle, 1969) and, as such, derives from seniority. To invoke authority and hierarchy is to reaffirm differences in status and rank that position people at different levels in the organization. Reifying the culture tool kit draws on senior managers' declarative powers (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) in producing the discursive template and privileges its meanings in terms of how the change is framed. In this way senior managers' use of communicative practices served to reproduce existing hierarchical relationships. Middle managers play an equally important role in these processes.
By holding their senior managers to account by demanding success criteria, time lines, and action plans, middle managers' communicative practices also served to reproduce these relationships by acknowledging -and helping to bring into being -senior managers' responsibilities. Thus what may appear to be solid organizational structures and processes are held in place through language and the negotiation of meaning.
In sum, organization and change emerge at the interstices of power and resistance among senior and subordinate groups, whether they are senior and middle managers, managers and employees, or change agents and change recipients. For this reason, we caution against conceptualizing successful change implementation as solely "the change agent's job" and making them wholly responsible for "the relationship with recipients, as well as the tactics of change implementation" (Ford et al., 2008: 373) . In fact, we counsel against the language of change "agent"
and change "recipient" altogether, since it sets up a duality in which change is conceptualized as a one-way process and which fails to locate subordinate actors as co-constructors of change. We propose that change emerges at the interstices of power-resistance relations in which both senior and subordinate actors are implicated.
Conclusions
This study provides further empirical support for performative accounts of change by using an organizational becoming perspective to learn more about the negotiation of meaning and powerresistance relations in the context of organizational change (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) . Process studies of organizing that focus on the emergent "activities by which collective endeavours unfold" have, in the main, been theoretical ( Van de Ven and Poole, 2005: 1387) . Our study shows how these evanescent processes emerge in naturally occurring organizational talk targeted towards specific organizational change objectives. By studying patterns in the negotiation of meaning and examining how power-resistance relations between senior and middle managers influence them, we develop a model that shows how particular communicative practices can lead to generative dialogue, within which resistance plays a facilitative role. In this way, we show how the dynamics of conceptual expansion, combination and reframing explicated by Tsoukas (forthcoming) play out in an organizational setting and, further, how they lead to organizational change that is more likely to be synergistic and innovative because it is based on the transformation of new knowledge. We also identify another set of dynamics in which power-resistance relations are oppositional. So far, this dynamic of degenerative dialogue has not been empirically investigated. Our study helps to elaborate the way in which particular communicative practices produce conceptual closure, demarcation and sterility showing that, while change may still occur, it is more likely to be imposed and based on existing knowledge held by one group and not necessarily shared by the other.
Our study has the following limitations. First, we focused on two managerial groups for analytical purposes, but we acknowledge that there were differences within each of these groups and,
further, that power-resistance relations permeate beyond a simple senior/middle manager dichotomy.
Second, we recorded and analyzed only the talk of the workshop participants. Talk is an embodied activity and occurs in the context of other aspects of interaction -the tone of voice, facial expressions, body language -not included in our analysis. We also accepted the text of the workshop at "face value" since we were unaware of behind-the-scenes agendas, personal relationships and in-jokes that would have provided a "subtext" to these negotiations. Finally, we focus on a three-hour workshop in order to conduct an in-depth, finely grained analysis of the construction of meaning in keeping with an organizational becoming perspective. However, this meant that we were unable to study what happened in other workshops, or whether the outcomes of this workshop scaled up to impact on wider organizational relations. Nor were we able to examine the backdrop of organizational restructuring and job losses, as well as a downturn in the industry, which form part of the wider organizational and socio-economic power-resistance relations within which the workshop was located (Contu and Willmott, 2003) .
These limitations notwithstanding, there is considerable potential for further work based on this approach. One issue that invites further investigation is "resistance to resistance" by senior managers i.e., resistance by subordinates is integral to the transformation of knowledge and yet, dominant actors may well respond to it in ways that preclude such an outcome. Such reactions may help to account for the failure of change programs, but these processes have not yet been fully investigated. There are also opportunities for a more explicit consideration of both power and resistance in change processes. For example, through the selective use of communicative practices, senior managers may be able control certain meanings -perhaps those on which their managerial prerogative is founded -while allowing more open dialogue around meanings that are less sensitive and thereby giving subordinates the illusion of being "autonomous agents whilst still 'enacting' organizational rituals" (Kosmala and Herrbach, 2006: 1401) . Similarly, there is scope for more nuanced conceptualizations of resistance that incorporate a consideration of ambivalence (cf. Piderit, 2000) since, as our study shows, resistance can veer from facilitative to oppositional during a single workshop. Finally, there is a need for more work on communicative practice in organizations to examine what it is that actors do as they continuously construct reality (cf. Jarzabkowski, 2005 ). While we have identified certain practices linked to generative and degenerative dialogue, this is not to suggest in any way that these are the only communicative practices that can be used and further exploration of these processes is needed. The meanings out of which organizations emerge are coconstructed by actors and we need to know more about the interactions among different groups of organizational members if we are to understand the processes whereby organizations come into being. SE1: I wonder if there's an opportunity to re-visit the mission statement? I think we should be making sure that our customers are business-to-business customers and we should be fitting in when they want to launch. Now when a customer walks through the door he wants to hear that -he's got a date in his mind, if we can hit that date -whether it's first in the market or not, he makes that decision but we should just ensure that we hit their project dates. [...] A software engineer asks who the customer is and whether it is another business. [4] SE1: I believe that we're [local site] customer-oriented. I think we are customer focused as an organization and we have been all the way through even in our history. I think we're a customer-focused organization. [...] A software engineer argues that the UK site is customer focused. There is a shift from defining the nature of the relationship with the customer to claims that UK site already is customer focused.
[5] HE1: External customers I think it would have to be to be honest … we're miles away from the customer and have been for quite a few years now, so I'd kind of struggle with that. [...] A debate follows in which software engineers emphasize their existing close relationship with customer; this is disputed by some other participants.
[6] HO2: But maybe you mean different things with customers, my interpretation is that when you say customer you mean the enduser. [...] The discussion returns to who the customer is. [7] SE3: So I think we are focused on our customer's needs and how we can address them.
Claim that UK site already is customer focused reemerges. [8] SS2: But you also need to look at the different streams of being customer focused and commercially focused, I'm not sure that as an organization we're necessarily commercially aware … [...] The importance of customer focus is challenged; instead there is a need for a commercial focus. There is an attempt to shift to emphasis to who is responsible for the customer. [10] SSM2: As an organization as we're expecting a lot of our engineers and project managers to be going out to our customers and putting those deals and contracts in place. But
The discussion returns to the need for a commercial focus: regardless of whether the engineers are close 8 HO= head office manager; SSM= senior site manager; SS = support staff manager; SE = software engineer; HE = hardware engineer; SM = senior manager (includes HOs and SSMs); MM = middle managers (includes SEs, HEs, and SSs). The numbers beside each participant in the left hand column indicate the order in which the person first participates in the discussion. The numbers in the right hand column provide cross references to Figure 1 . The use of parentheses, i.e. […] , indicates that interventions by one or more participants have been edited out and the use of dots, i.e., … indicates that part of an individual intervention has been edited. the engineers who are going out and meeting customers need to be commercially aware. They need to be aware of the contracts they're putting in place and the implications of the contracts because if we don't meet them we annoy our customers and they disappear. [...] to the customer, they still need to be commercially aware. [11] SE1: Can we have just a hands-up? Who thinks we are customer focused just … [Many hands go up]. So we're about sort of sixty percent would you say that think we are customer focused. [...] A software engineer returns to his claim that they are already customer focused. [12] HE4: I think it's an important point that we are customer focused. I think there is some confusion about who the customer is. [...] The discussion returns to who is the customer -end-user vs. business; the claim that the company already is customer focused continues.
[13] SE1: I think it's important to recognize that we are still learning how to be a platform provider and you know we're not there yet. [...] Some tempering of the claim that they are already customer focused with the recognition that they could be more so. [14] HE4: I'm a little bit unsure what we're talking about when we talk about customer focus, are we talking about delivering precisely what our customers are asking for or are we talking about having an interactive discussion with them to understand what the market really wants and setting our mission on that basis … … I don't think as an organization we've got that interactive discussion, we make lots of promises to all our customers but we don't seem to prioritize things … we just promise.
Discussion returns to the nature of the relationship as interactive. [15] SE5: As I see it, we've got a customer focus for internal and external. A lot of people go out and actually talk to the customers and they actually focus on satisfying their customers' needs. So depending where you are, what level you are, you have a focus on customer needs. [...] The discussion returns to who is the customer but instead of end-user vs. business, it switches to internal vs. external. [16] SSM1: What you seem to be saying is there's the internal view which seems to be wonderful and the external view has a slightly different tinge to it. [...] More tempering of the view that they believe that are already customer focused but not all (external) customers might agree.
[17] HE4: Well I'm struggling to find the … point of talking to the customers. I don't believe the customers have any more idea than we do of where they want to go … they're just as confused in terms of what the market's going to do as we are… […] Discussion shifts back to the relationship but views vary over whether the customer or the company should be dominant. [18] HO3 [in video presentation]: We talk to the customers; the key thing is having good relationships with customers to give them good support to make them feel that we are good suppliers to them… we can also talk freely … to our customers therefore we can talk about the problems and we can be honest. […] The video presentation returns to the issue of customer focus, defined in terms of an honest relationship. [19] SE6: The interesting thing with all this culture stuff is that there is nothing anywhere about things that matter from our point of view, like profitability and, and our commercial focus. [...] and is also supported by engineers. [20] Flip chart from exercise states: STOP -unrealistic time scales; START -profit focus; CONTINUE -improve commercial focus
The importance of customer focus has now been replaced by the need for a commercial focus. SSM2: … We should continue to improve the commercial focus of the organization … we need to be committed to being more commercial focused. [understand] the different current cultures within the organization today and the goal is to create one company, one culture but it's also an ongoing process … We're going to, of course, put the target culture into a lot of different activities. We don't know if you're going to be here in [2003] [2004] . But we have a goal to create, work as one company with one culture and we're today and this is the road that we're going to take. So the end of August is the first step … The head office manager returns to implementation defined in terms of the first step, which is to conduct the remaining workshop (by August); also mentions possible job losses [18] SE4: we need to present that road map to the team before we get into this… A software engineer returns to need for road map [19] HO1: …we [head office] have a project plan describing in more detail what kind of activities we will take in the future. But it's also important not to talk too much about the future -what we are going to do as the next step … I don't think we have the time or the possibility to go through different activities.
The head office manager returns to definition of activities as decided by head office [20] HO2: I think the first step is really to create an awareness about … [the] culture, and creating some common language and shared values … …. And then as [SM1] says, what will happen in August is that the result, the outcome of all the different workshops … will be compiled into an analysis; a report that will be presented to the [head office] management which [SSM2] and I are part of. And then there will be decisions taken about what the next step is.
Another head office manager returns to implementation as the first step, which is culture awareness; repeats instructions for timing; implementation defined in terms of a report; decisions to be taken by head office. This is challenged by a head office manager as infeasible.
[23] HE2: Can I make a suggestion for something we could do locally? ... could each manager then take for example three or four of the actions and say right I'm now going to implement these within my team….Then at least we're showing some results … A hardware engineer returns to original definition of implementation as actions to be decided by the local site [24] . HO1: … that's not actions that you should be doing [in the local site] ... This is directly refuted by a head office manager [25] 
